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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the widespread adoption of otherwise comprehensive
comparative fault schemes,' the status of "assumption of risk" has
remained insecure.2  Courts have had difficulty deciding
whether-and how-assumption of risk should apply, as illustrated
* Assistant Professor, Gonzaga Law School; Stanford Univ., B.A., 1971; Yale Law
School, J.D. 1979.
** Candidate for J.D., Gonzaga Law School; Wellesley College, B.A., 1974; N.Y.U.,
M.B.A. 1977. The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of several
readers and critics of previous drafts, including Robert Natelson, Carl Tobias, and Steven
Smith.
1. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, §§ 1.4, 1.5 app. A (2d ed. 1986) (state stat-
utes and judicial rulings regarding the adoption of comparative systems); UNIFORM COMPAR-
ATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter UCFA].
2. As discussed more fully below, many jurisdictions have purported to abolish as-
sumption of risk or "merge" it with other doctrines, but only for some purposes. See infra
notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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by a recent case: Sixto Benitez, a high school football player, suf-
fered a broken neck during a varsity football game, leaving him a
quadriplegic.3 He sued the school board and the athletic league,
alleging that his coach had been negligent.4 The school district in-
terposed the defense of assumption of risk.'
Courts have treated assumption of risk inconsistently.6 Some
courts treat the plaintiff's decision to engage in risky activities as a
bar to any claim;7 others ignore it by "merging" assumption of risk
with contributory negligence; 8 still others look for a middle path.'
Even comprehensive schemes for comparative fault have virtually
ignored assumption of risk as an independent doctrine.10 This arti-
3. Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 541 N.E.2d 29 (1988).
4. Specifically, Benitez alleged that: (1) the coach had put him in the lineup at a stage
in the game when the coach should have known he was fatigued, and, therefore, prone to
injury; and (2) the opponent was an athletically superior team, and the decision to play the
two teams against each other was unreasonably risky. Id. at 655-56, 541 N.E.2d at 31-32.
5. Benitez in turn claimed that his decision to play was involuntary because of an
"implied compulsion" and the fear that he would lose scholarship opportunities. Id. The
jury found that Benitez had assumed the risk of injury voluntarily, and assigned 30 percent
of the fault to him and 70 percent to the defendants, and the jury thereby reduced his
$878,330 award accordingly. Id. Although the Appellate Division affirmed, the New York
Court of Appeals dismissed the entire claim, holding that the "luckless accident" arose
"from the vigorous voluntary participation in competitive interscholastic athletics." Id. at
659, 541 N.E.2d at 34.
6. Other recreational activities cases raise the same question: Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey
Club, 861 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1988) (horse racing); Cassio v. Creighton Univ., 233 Neb. 160,
446 N.W.2d 704 (1989) (scuba diving); Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wash. App.
571, 636 P.2d 492 (1981) (mountain climbing); Conradt v. Four Star Promotions, 45 Wash.
App. 847, 728 P.2d 617 (1986) (car racing); Brewer v. Ski-lift, Inc., 234 Mont. 109, 762 P.2d
226, (1988) (skiing); Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987)
(cheerleading); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center, 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 214 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1985) (parachuting); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E.
173 (1929) (amusement park attraction, "the Flopper"); Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559
(La. 1981) (ice skating).
7. Whipple v. Salvation Army, 261 Or. 453, 495 P.2d 739 (1972) (fifteen-year-old boy
assumed the risk of playing football, and his claim based on negligent training and supervi-
sion was, therefore, barred).
8. Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 1978) (skier
sued ski resort for negligent placement of steel pole; trial court properly refused to give
assumption of risk instruction, because "when comparative negligence determines percent-
ages of negligence and of contributory negligence, it sufficiently considers the effect of as-
sumption of risk and avoids the confusion which would result from giving both definitions to
the jury."). On the concept of abolition generally, see infra text accompanying notes 106-12.
9. Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987) (cheer-
leader's recovery based on university's negligence reduced by percentage of her injury at-
tributable to assumption of risk inherent in cheerleading).
10. For example, the UCFA narrowly defines "fault" as "unreasonable assumption of
risk," which, the Official Comment notes, is only another term for contributory negligence.
The Official Comment notes other meanings of assumption of risk (valid contractual release;
no breach of duty; and reasonable assumption of risk); but none are included in the defini-
tion of "fault." UCFA, supra note 1, § 1(b) and Official Comment. See also infra text ac-
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cle proposes replacing the inconsistent treatment of assumption of
risk with an approach based on Calabresi and Hirschoff's sugges-
tion that assumption of risk "is, and always has been, a kind of
plaintiff's strict liability-the other side of the coin of defendant's
strict liability."" Under such a view, assumption of risk represents
a plaintiff's decision to engage in conduct that poses such a high
risk of injury that it is fair to make the risk-taker bear at least
some of the risk of injury, even when the risk was a reasonable one.
The logical extension of this position is to reduce, rather than bar,
an otherwise valid claim.
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A. Contributory Negligence and Last Clear Chance
The contributory negligence rule, 2 first articulated in the
nineteenth century, operated as a bar to a plaintiff's recovery if the
plaintiff had been negligent. 13 The doctrine of last clear chance,
originating in 1842 in the English case of Davies v. Mann," was an
attempt to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence
rule. It allowed a plaintiff full recovery, even if the plaintiff had
been negligent, if the defendant had the "last clear chance," or fi-
nal opportunity, to avoid an accident.15 Although last clear chance
favored plaintiffs-permitting even a negligent plaintiff to recover
all of her damages-it still arbitrarily allowed either a full recovery
companying notes 115-16.
11. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1065 (1972).
12. The contributory negligence rule should be differentiated from the fact of contrib-
utory negligence. A plaintiffs negligence has traditionally been termed "contributory negli-
gence." Although the modern rule is to reduce, rather than bar, a recovery by the percentage
of contributory negligence, the term contributory negligence continues to be a useful term to
identify negligent conduct by a plaintiff.
13. W. PROSSER, D. DoBs, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 65,
at 451 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
14. 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). The plaintiff negligently left his jackass tied in the mid-
dle of the road, and the defendant ran over it. The court held that the plaintiff could none-
theless recover (in full), because the defendant had the "last clear opportunity" to avoid the
accident if the defendant had used sufficient care. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 66,
at 463. Holding the doctrine in no great esteem, Prosser and Keeton noted that it became
the "'jackass doctrine,' with whatever implication it may carry." Id. § 66, at 463 n.2.
Part of the rationale for employing last clear chance was an argument that, if the plain-
tiff's negligence is complete when the injury occurs (such as the pitiful jackass in the middle
of the road), the defendant's actions then become the sole proximate cause of the injury. Id.
§ 66, at 463. The difficulty with this argument is that it is impossible to draw a meaningful
distinction (consistent with contemporary notions of proximate cause) between cases in
which the plaintiffs negligence has ceased and those in which it continues as a proximate
cause of the injury.
15. Id. § 66, at 463.
1990]
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or none at all. Last clear chance, always a doctrinal muddle, was
sustained largely by the otherwise unacceptably harsh conse-
quences of the contributory negligence rule."6 When comparative
negligence eliminated the need for the doctrine, most jurisdictions
cheerfully jettisoned it. 7
B. Assumption of Risk
Although assumption of risk was identified early in the com-
mon law as a defense distinct from ordinary contributory negli-
gence," both operated as a total bar to the plaintiff's claim for re-
covery. 9 Although application of the assumption of risk doctrine
did not require proof of negligence, it frequently coincided with
the fact of negligence, because a plaintiff's voluntary encounter of
a known risk would often be negligent.20 However, the scope of the
doctrine included non-negligent behavior as well; otherwise, the
doctrine would have been superfluous, because any negligence on
the part of the plaintiff would be a complete bar anyway. Fqr ex-
ample, suppose that the owner of an ice-skating rink negligently
prepared the surface of the ice, making it unreasonably slippery."
The plaintiff noticed that the ice was very slippery, but continued
to skate anyway, until he fell and was injured. If the plaintiff sued
the defendant, two affirmative defenses were available at common
16. Id. § 66, at 468.
17. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 872 (1975). Some jurisdictions retain under the name of last clear chance a re-
lated doctrine, which treats willful or wanton conduct as more culpable than mere negli-
gence. Thus, in the "jackass case" the defendant might be required to pay for the entire
injury, despite the plaintiff's negligence, if the defendant's failure to avoid injury to the
plaintiff was wanton, that is, a callous indifference to the plaintiff's plight. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 13, § 66, at 464.
18. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 68, at 482. A significant difference be-
tween contributory negligence and assumption of risk is that contributory negligence usually
involves inadvertence; assumption of risk, on the other hand, has been based upon a con-
scious choice by the plaintiff to engage in conduct the plaintiff knows to be dangerous.
Thus, contributory negligence is measured by an objective standard (the reasonably prudent
person), whereas assumption of risk is measured by a subjective one (whether the plaintiff
actually knew of the risk and then voluntarily chose to encounter it).
19. Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 203 Mont. 90, 93, 661 P.2d 17, 18 (1983) (common
law defense of assumption of risk defeats plaintiff's claim when he voluntarily exposed him-
self to a known danger, even if such exposure was reasonable).
20. If a plaintiff decides consciously to undergo a risk that is unreasonably dangerous
(e.g., driving with brakes negligently repaired by the defendant), a jury may find both negli-
gence (judged by an objective standard of what the reasonably prudent person would do)
and assumption of risk (judged by the subjective standard of whether the plaintiff, despite
actual knowledge of a risk, voluntarily proceeded to encounter it).
21. The facts of this example are based upon Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), discussed infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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law: first, that the plaintiff was negligent, i.e., his conduct fell be-
low the standard of reasonable care.22 Second, the defendant would
assert that the plaintiff assumed the risk that he would be injured,
irrespective of negligence. If a jury found either one of these two
doctrines applied, the plaintiff's claim was completely barred.
Clearly, in many instances both doctrines applied.2"
However, in other cases the two diverged. Assumption of risk
also applied when the plaintiff was unaware of the defendant's
negligence, but had agreed with the defendant to take a chance
with some risky activity. Courts held that this consent waived any
claim for negligence. The most frequent application of the doctrine
of assumption of risk in this sense was in the employment context
prior to workers' compensation reforms.2 If the employee was
aware of the employment-related danger, it did not matter that
reasonable care was used in encountering that risk; the employee's
claim against the employer was barred. So long as the employer
provided a reasonably safe place of work, an injured employee who
voluntarily encountered a known risk at work had no claim against
the employer. Today, the defense is rarely applied to the master-
servant relationship because of workers' compensation statutes.2
The numerous commentators on assumption of risk have
22. This contributory negligence defense required the fact-finder to evaluate the plain-
tiff's behavior by the same standard of reasonable care used in a determination of negligence
by the defendant. However, the effect was quite different. A finding of negligence on the
part of the plaintiff would bar the plaintiffs claim, even if the defendant had been negli-
gent, while a negligent defendant must compensate a blameless plaintiff for injury only
when he alone was negligent.
23. E.g., Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d 874, 881, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1977)
(passenger assumed the risk of riding with a drunk); Kroger Co. v. Haun, 177 Ind. App. 403,
379 N.E.2d 1004, 1014 (1978) (defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
could overlap); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291-92, on remand 350 So. 2d 25 (Fla.
1977) (merging defense of assumption of risk into the defense of contributory negligence).
24. The doctrine developed during the industrial revolution, reflecting the tendency of
the courts to "insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead'
which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of industrialized busi-
ness." Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943). These early roots of
assumption of risk provided the rationale for a Montana court to hold that the application
of assumption of risk outside the employer-employee relationship should be narrowly con-
fined. Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 653, 677
(1981).
25. Workers' compensation laws have virtually abolished this defense in work-related
injuries. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 9.1 (1986). Workers' compensation statutes generally
hold the immediate employer strictly liable for all injuries to an employee arising out of and
in the course of employment. In return for a guaranteed (but modest) recovery, the em-
ployee is prohibited from suing the immediate employer. But see O'Reilly, Risks of Assump-
tions: Impacts of Regulatory Label Warnings Upon Industrial Products Liability, 37 CATH.
U.L. REv. 85 (1987) (federal involvement in dissemination of information will restore vitality
to the assumption of risk defense in future toxic illness cases brought by employees).
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noted the different meanings given to the phrase "assumption of
risk."2
1. "Primary" Assumption of Risk
In one kind of assumption of risk case the plaintiff has, in ef-
fect, instructed the defendant to use less care than would other-
wise be required, because the plaintiff sees some advantage in a
less rigorous devotion to safety. 7 These cases have been called
"primary" assumption of risk, because the focus is upon redefining
the defendant's duty of care, rather than upon whether the plain-
tiff should be denied recovery for an otherwise valid claim.28 For
example, in Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club,29 the plaintiff was
injured by an errant baseball while she sat in the stands. The court
found that baseball patrons preferred to have at least some un-
screened seats in order to see the game better, and, therefore, the
stadium owner was not negligent in providing them.
Another place to apply the doctrine of primary assumption of
risk is on the ski slope. The safest way for a skier to travel from
the top of the mountain to the bottom is by a gradual slope. If
skiing were simply a means of transportation, reasonable care
would require that, insofar as economically practical, steep slopes
be converted into bunny slopes. Yet in fact many skiers seek out
steep slopes to heighten their enjoyment. In effect, just as baseball
patrons in Brown were held to have told the stadium owners to
leave seats unscreened, skiers tell ski operators not to eliminate
steep slopes.30 Thus, ski operators who provide a steep slope can
26. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 68, at 480; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE, § 9.1, at 154 (2d ed. 1986); Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases,
22 LA. L. REV. 122, 124-30 (1961); Rosenlund and Killion, Once A Wicked Sister: The Con-
tinuing Role of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Fault in California, 20 U.S.F. L.
REV. 225 (1986); Smith, The Last Days of Assumption of the Risk, 5 GONz. L. REV. 190
(1970); Gaetanos, Essay-Assumption of Risk: Casuistry in the Law of Negligence, 83 W.
VA. L. REV. 471 (1981).
27. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127-28 (2d ed. 1977).
28. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, §68, at 496.
29. 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950). Accord'Arnold v. City of Cedar Rapids,
443 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1989) (owner of softball facility not liable for spectator injury under
primary assumption of risk analysis).
30. At least five states adopted statutes barring a skier from recovering from ski oper-
ators for injuries sustained from risks inherent to skiing. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 143, § 71P
(Law. Co-op. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731, 736 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
7102(c) (Purdon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-53 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037
(1989 Supp.).
Some statutes have been challenged on constitutional grounds. For example, the Mon-
tana "Skier's Responsibility" statute originally stated that a "skier assumes the risk and all
legal responsibility for injury to himself or loss of property that results from participating in
6
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properly say that they acted with reasonable care even if, following
Learned Hand's calculus,31 the risk might have been cheaply
avoided.2 But the proper treatment of cases involving unscreened
baseball seats, steep ski slopes, and the like, is not to invoke a sep-
arate defense called "assumption of risk," but rather to formulate
an instruction on the nature of reasonable care such as: "In deter-
mining the standard of reasonable care expected of the defendant,
you should consider the preferences of the average [baseball pa-
tron] [skier]. If [baseball patrons] [skiers] actually prefer to face
the risk that is complained of in this case, you may find the de-
fendant to have exercised reasonable care." 33
2. "Secondary" Assumption of Risk
"Secondary" assumption of risk cases look quite different from
"primary" assumption of risk cases. 4 In a "secondary" case the
the sport of skiing by virtue of his participation." MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-736(1)(1979)
(amended 1989). In Brewer v. Ski-lift, Inc., 234 Mont. 109, 762 P.2d 226 (1988), the court
held that parts of the statute unconstitutionally deprived an injured skier of legal recourse
against the intentional or negligent acts of the ski operator. The amended Montana Code
Annotated § 23-2-736 (1989) deleted the assumption of risk language, listed the skier's af-
firmative duties, prohibited certain conduct and added subsection (4), stating, "A skier must
accept all legal responsibility for injury or damage of any kind to the extent that the injury
or damage results from risks inherent in the sport of skiing." The statute lists inherent risks
in skiing, such as bare spots, variations in terrain, avalanches, and weather changes. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 23 -2-736(4)(a)-(g) (1989).
31. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (liability depends
on whether the burden of preventing injury is less than the probability of injury multiplied
by the gravity of potential injury).
32. Learned Hand's calculus usually is thought to include only the burden upon the
defendant to avoid the injury. If the calculus were broadened to include the costs imposed
upon the plaintiff, or society as a whole, it would include (in the skiing case) the psychic
cost to skiers of making the activity less dangerous. In any event, the point is that the
standard of reasonable care sometimes permits the defendant to maintain a dangerous con-
dition (because plaintiffs prefer it that way) even if it could have been made safe at nominal
economic cost.
33. Such an instruction would eliminate recoveries based upon those aspects of the
sport commonly thought to be inherent risks (icy slopes), but still provide recoveries in
cases in which the danger is not unique to the activity (collapsing chair lift).
34. Unfortunately, many commentators have used the term "primary" assumption of
risk to describe cases in which the defendant was negligent, but plaintiff's conduct made a
recovery inequitable. For example, in Parker v. Maule Indus., Inc., 321 So. 2d 106, 107-08
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), a dissenting judge posed the following hypothetical: suppose a
driver has poor vision, impaired reflexes, and defective brakes on his car. Nonetheless, fully
aware of these limitations, a passenger asks for a ride home. If the driver has an accident on
the way home, the passenger should be barred from recovery, because it is inconceivable
how "under any system of justice [the passenger] should be allowed to recover." Id. at 108
(Boyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In this hypothetical, it is hard to deny that the
driver had been negligent. Such a case should not fall within the doctrine of primary as-
sumption of risk, analogous to the unscreened baseball seat or the steep ski slope, because
one cannot say that, under the circumstances, the driver exercised reasonable care. How-
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plaintiff's claim may be barred even when the defendant's conduct
is negligent, because the plaintiff consciously chose to engage in
the activity. 5 It is important to emphasize that unless the defend-
ant is negligent,3" liability will not be imposed anyway, and no sep-
arate defense is needed or relevant. However, if the defendant
would ordinarily be required to compensate the plaintiff, under
what circumstances and to what extent will the law relieve the de-
fendant of that duty because the plaintiff chose to engage in the
activity that caused the injury?
Generations of courts and commentators have complained
about the confusion surrounding the multiple meanings of "as-
sumption of risk," particularly in this "secondary" sense.3 7 The de-
cision to bar or reduce the plaintiff's recovery has been variously
related to whether the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk
presented by the activity;"s whether the plaintiff knew about the
defendant's negligence or other breach of duty;39 whether the
plaintiff had alternatives to the risky activity; 0 and whether the
plaintiff's conduct was reasonable or not.4 1
Numerous commentators have heroically attempted to cata-
ever, the plaintiff's recovery could be barred by the application of equitable estoppel.
35. In Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), the
court explained that "secondary" assumption of risk "is an affirmative defense to an estab-
lished breach of duty." Id. at 49, 155 A.2d at 93.
36. Of course, strict liability exists under some circumstances, but for present pur-
poses the point is that plaintiff must demonstrate that, in the absence of contributory fault,
there is an entitlement to shift the injury to the defendant.
37. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68, (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring):
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expres-
sion; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a
legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contra-
dictory ideas.
See also Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 1988) (confusion caused
by phrase "assumption of risk"). See also supra note 13.
38. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 76-77, 376 A.2d 329, 333
(1985) (plaintiff injured by errant hockey puck; assumption of risk requires proof of "the
exercise of one's free will in encountering the risk").
39. Nganga v. College of Wooster, No. 2414, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1989)
(soccer player's knowledge of rough play barred his claim); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,
521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988) (swimmer's knowledge of diving into shallow area reduced dam-
ages); Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1983) (assumption of
risk barred claim when skier's testimony indicated knowledge of risk).
40. Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 99 Cal. App. 2d 484, 222 P.2d 19 (1950)
(screened seats available to baseball patron).
41. Turcotte v. Fell, 123 Misc. 2d 877, -, 474 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (1984) (jockey rea-
sonably assumed risk of injury in exchange for substantial reward); Segoviano v. Housing
Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 164, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579 (1983) (decision to play flag foot-
ball was not unreasonable).
8
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logue each of the different variations of assumption of risk. "2 Al-
though some terminological clarity is essential, yet another cata-
logue of the various kinds of assumption of risk-and whether they
have or have not survived the adoption of comparative
fault-would not be fruitful. Instead, this article will demonstrate
that assumption of risk, if treated as a form of plaintiff's strict lia-
bility, results in a doctrinally satisfying and practically enforceable
system of comparative fault.
III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND THE ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE
FAULT
The contributory negligence rule received criticism on two
grounds: first, it was inequitable, because it "place[d] upon one
party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis,
responsible.' 3 Second, it was arbitrary; it forced juries to make an
all-or-nothing choice between assigning to the plaintiff either the
entire loss or none." The adoption of comparative fault struck at
both of these features: first, by permitting apportionment of fault
it avoided the injustice of punishing the plaintiff more severely
than the defendant; and second, it avoided the arbitrariness of
making an all-or-nothing determination of fault.
Comparative fault appeared to eliminate many of the complex
doctrines surrounding contributory negligence, relying instead
upon the flexibility of the jury's allocation of fault to produce an
appropriate result. However, courts were undecided on whether to
extend such thinking to assumption of risk."' The California Su-
preme Court's opinion in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.46 is typical. In dis-
cussing the problems associated with implementing a comparative
fault system, the court raised the issue of assumption of risk. Fol-
42. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108, 109 (1961)
(two categories, express and implied); Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Product Liability
Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122, 149-54 (1961) (six categories: "express," "subjectively consensual,"
"objectively consensual," "consent to conduct," "associational," and "imposed"); Green, As-
sumed Risk as a Defense, 22 LA. L. REV. 77 (1961) (assumption of risk cases fall into catego-
ries of intended harms, traffic, manufacturers and suppliers, landowners, master-servant,
slip and fall, and contractors); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 21.1, 21.6 (1956
& Supp. 1968) (three categories of assumption of risk defined in terms of conceptual overlap
with duty, contributory negligence, and contract law).
43. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 67, at 468-69.
44. Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 208-09, 650 P.2d 772, 774-
75 (1982) (citing Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976)); Kopischke v. First Conti-
nental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 504-05, 610 P.2d 668, 686 (1980).
45. Nonetheless, some states statutorily abolished the assumption of risk defense. E.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.475 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 1989).
46. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872 (1975).
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lowing many commentators on the issue, the court distinguished
two different concepts covered by the term:
To simplify greatly, it has been observed ... that in one kind of
situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to en-
counter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant's negli-
gence, plaintiff's conduct, although he may encounter that risk in
a prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory negligence.
... Other kinds of situations arise within the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held to re-
lieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward
him. Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence,
but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care."
The court went on to rule that assumption of risk could simply be
merged with contributory negligence '8 in those cases in which "the
form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of
contributory negligence." '' But if assumption of risk appeared, like
last clear chance, to be another relic of the contributory negligence
rule, such thinking ignored the fact that assumption of risk had
never been solely a creature of the contributory negligence rule
and required independent treatment.
One alternative would be to continue to treat assumption of
risk as a bar, rather than a damage-reducing factor. Some courts
and commentators continue to justify assumption of risk as a com-
plete bar because they view assumption of risk as somehow more
culpable than mere contributory negligence. For example, in Ken-
nedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc .5  an errant hockey puck
struck a spectator. The court held that her voluntary subjection to
a known risk constituted "consent" to the possibility of harm and
that such conduct is "worlds apart from one who unwittingly and
unsuspectingly falls prey to another's negligence."51 In this respect,
assumption of risk resembles the mirror image of last clear chance,
in which a plaintiff's contributory negligence is superseded because
of the defendant's "clear"-that is, conscious-chance to avoid the
injury." But to the extent that a comparative system has replaced
47. Id. at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73 (quoting Grey v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 245-46, 418 P.2d 153, 156, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545,
548 (1966)).
48. To say that assumption of risk will be "merged" with contributory negligence is to
say, in effect, that it will be eliminated, because it will no longer have any independent
contribution to the defendant's case.
49. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
50. 119 R.I. 70, 73, 376 A.2d 329, 331 (1977).
51. Id. at 77, 376 A.2d at 333. See also Comment, infra note 118.
52. The last clear chance doctrine also emphasized the fact that the defendant's con-
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the all-or-nothing doctrine of last clear chance, it makes sense to
judge the plaintiff's last clear chance-if that is what assumption
of risk resembles-by a comparative rather than all-or-nothing
standard."3
IV. PROPOSAL: THE CONCEPT OF "FAULT" SHOULD INCLUDE (EVEN
REASONABLE) ASSUMPTION OF RISK
As noted above, the supporters of comparative fault hoped to
eliminate not only the injustice of treating the plaintiff's negli-
gence as more culpable than the defendant's, but also arbitrary
distinctions between different categories of behavior. The goal was
a system in which different kinds of conduct can each be ascribed a
percentage of responsibility for causing the plaintiff's harm.5 4
Modern comparative fault statutes, such as the Uniform Compara-
tive Fault Act, 55 use the term "fault" to include much more than
"negligence":
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or
others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term
also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk
not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a prod-
uct for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unrea-
sonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal
duct came "last," that is, after the plaintiff's negligence was known to the defendant. But
because the timing of the respective parties' negligence has no bearing on the policy ques-
tions underlying the decision of who should bear the loss, a search for the "last" act of
negligence is futile.
53. Some commentators suggested that when a defendant's negligence forces a plain-
tiff into a situation in which the plaintiff must reasonably choose to undergo the risk, the
defendant should be held liable and the damages should not be reduced. PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 13, § 68. This view is similar to that of another commentator, who described
this situation in terms of full or limited preferences of the plaintiff. When reasonable as-
sumption of risk is based on full preference, it should operate as a bar; but if based on
limited preference, it coincides either with contributory negligence or no negligence at all.
This author suggests dropping the term "assumption of risk" altogether. Simons, Assump-
tion of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U.L. REV.
213 (1987).
54. E.g, statutes providing comparative "responsibility" rather than comparative neg-
ligence: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-64-122 (1988); IowA CODE ANN. § 668.1 (West 1988); MINN.
STAT. § 604.01 Subd. la (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1988). See, e.g., Note, Howard
v. Allstate Insurance Co. (520 So. 2d 715 (La.)) -Louisiana's Attempt at Comparative
Causation, 49 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1171 n.36 (1989) (listing states that have adopted "compara-
tive causation"). In addition, some jurisdictions have judicially interpreted their general
comparative statutes to include strict liability. E.g., Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 65
Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788
(1980). See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
55. UCFA, supra note 1, §1(b).
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requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis
for liability and to contributory fault."
Strangely, however, courts and commentators balked at integrating
assumption of risk into comparative fault schemes because it is not
necessarily based on negligence." For example, when the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co." proposed as a general
principle of tort law that liability should be assigned in proportion
to fault, courts responded with widespread approbation. 9 But
when it came to considering assumption of risk, the court could
not distinguish it from contributory negligence. 0° In contrast, the
same court in a later case had no difficulty in finding that a de-
fendant's strict liability for a defective product could be compared
to a plaintiff's ordinary negligence. 1 Over the dissent of justices
who complained that the court was mixing apples and oranges, 62
the majority held that sharing the loss was preferable to an arbi-
trary assignment to one party. 3 Other jurisdictions 4 and the Uni-
56. Id.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
58. 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
59. See, e.g., Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 988-89 n.12, 695 P.2d 369, 373-74 n.12
(1985); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Ky. 1984); Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field
Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 209, 650 P.2d 772, 775 (1982); Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585,
621, 256 N.W.2d 400, 417 (1977).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
61. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
62. Id. at 751, 575 P.2d at 1178, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (Jefferson, J., dissenting):
The majority's assumption that a jury is capable of making a fair apportionment
between a plaintiff's negligent conduct and a defendant's defective product is no
more logical or convincing than if a jury were to be instructed that it should add a
quart of milk (representing plaintiff's negligence) and a metal bar three feet in
length (representing defendant's strict liability for a defective product), and that
the two added together equal 100 percent[-] the total fault for plaintiff's injuries
See also Recent Cases, Negligence-Defenses-Applying Comparative Negligence to Strict
Products Liability, 4 W. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 284 (1977).
63. Justice Mosk, dissenting, disagreed. He disputed the majority's characterization of
the merger of assumption of risk and contributory negligence as "felicitous":
If a consumer elects to use a product patently defective when other alternatives
are available, or to use a product in a manner clearly not intended or foreseeable,
he assumes the risks inherent in his improper utilization and should not be heard
to complain about the condition of the object. One who employs a power saw to
trim his fingernails-and thereafter finds the number of his fingers re-
duced-should not prevail to any extent whatever against the manufacturer even
if the saw had a defective blade. I would retain assumption of risk as a total de-
fense to products liability, as it always has been.
Daly, at 763-64, 575 P.2d at 1185-86, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
64. Steagall, Illinois Adopts Comparative Assumption of Risk and Misuse in Strict
Products Liabilities Cases, 72 ILL. B.J. 476 (1984); Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict
Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REv. 872 (1982); Note, Setting the Standards for the Suffi-
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form Comparative Fault Act, proposed in 1977,5 did likewise. 6
When it came to assumption of risk, however, the confusion
over its different meanings and the preoccupation with negligence
as the essence of fault prevented a similar evolution toward equita-
ble apportionment. Another hindrance may have been the treat-
ment of strict liability for defendants in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. The Restatment authors had prescribed an all-or-noth-
ing, not comparative, approach where the defendant's abnormally
dangerous activities combined with a plaintiff's fault: a plaintiff
should be barred from recovery when she assumed the risk of the
abnormally dangerous activity, but contributory negligence should
not be a defense at all.6 7 (Ironically, this placed the negligent user
of dynamite in a better position than the non-negligent user who
was held strictly liable: the negligent-and presumably more cul-
ciency of an Assumption of Risk Defense in Oklahoma Manufacturers' Products Liability
Actions: Bingham v. Hollingsworth, 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 45 (1983).
65. Professor Wade, a drafter of the UCFA, commented that the Act was intended to
address peripheral problems that had been largely ignored by comparative fault statutes,
some of which had been hastily and inarticulately drafted in the wake of the no-fault insur-
ance movement. Conflicting pressure groups struck compromises that found their way into
the statutes lacking doctrinal coherence. The UCFA was an attempt to provide a more
workable model. Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act-What Should It Provide?, 10 J.
L. REFORM 220, 221 (1977). One of the peripheral issues was reasonable assumption of risk,
which was dismissed by the UCFA in a brief comment. See infra note 115 and accompany-
ing text. See also Note, The Reemergence of Implied Assumption of Risk in Florida, 10
NOVA L.J. 1343 (1986) (haphazard expansion of assumption of risk doctrine resulted in as-
sumption of risk operating as a complete defense).
66. See supra text accompanying note 55. The comment to this section justifies the
inclusion of strict liability on philosophical and practical grounds: strict liability for prod-
ucts and abnormally dangerous activities is similar to negligence per se; and a jury is capa-
ble of weighing the fault involved in selling a dangerous product or engaging in an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. UCFA, supra note 2, § 1 Comment.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1977):
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is not a defense to the strict liability of one who carries on an abnormally danger-
ous activity.
(2) The plaintiff's contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subject-
ing himself to the risk of harm from the activity is a defense to the strict liability.
At the time of the Second Restatement's formulation, the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence operated as a complete bar in many jurisdictions. The drafters of the Restatement
preserved this bar to remain consistent with the purpose of the strict liability doctrine,
which was to impose total responsibility on the defendant engaging in abnormally dangerous
activities. Id. § 524 comment a (1965). The comment also indicates the drafters' difficulty
with the logic of permitting a defense based on the plaintiff's negligence when strict liability
was not based on the defendant's negligent behavior. Id.
The justification of assumption of risk as a defense to strict liability is clouded by
describing this defense as including behavior that was either a voluntary encounter of a
known risk or a voluntary unreasonable encounter of a known risk. Id. § 524 comment b. As
Prosser observes, the latter involves fault and assumption of risk is not usually thought of as
a fault defense. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 79.
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pable-defendant could reduce liability by the percentage of plain-
tiff's negligence, whereas the strictly liable defendant could not.18 )
More recent attempts to consider the impact of contributory fault
on strict liability theories have leaned toward comparing the two
on a percentage basis, 9 as the California court did in Daly and as
the Uniform Law Commissioners did in the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act.7" Unfortunately, few courts have extended this principle
to plaintiff's strict liability.
Despite the belief of many courts and commentators that the
"apple" of negligence cannot be compared with the "orange" of no-
fault approaches, an all-or-nothing approach to assumption of risk
should be rejected for two reasons: first, for reasons of doctrine,
because of the symmetry between plaintiff's strict liability and de-
fendant's strict liability. This can best be explained through the
Calabresian theory of entitlements. The second argument is less
elegant, but perhaps more persuasive: unless a middle position is
found between the extremes of full recovery and no recovery, as-
sumption of risk will create the same dangers as the contributory
negligence rule: unjust and arbitrary application by fact-finders.
A. Assumption of Risk and the Calabresian Theory of
Entitlements
Tort liability is based upon a scheme of legal entitlements that
either creates tort liability or protects a person against the imposi-
tion of tort liability.71 When a loss or injury occurs, society must
decide whether to let the loss lie where it falls, 72 or to shift the loss
68. It is quite likely that the Restatement's position on abnormally dangerous activi-
ties was a creature of the contributory negligence rule: if the plaintiff would ordinarily be
barred from recovery if contributory negligence were recognized as a defense, the Restate-
ment authors may have believed that on balance the "all" position was better than the
"nothing" position. One can only speculate what the Restatement drafters' position would
have been had the option of a comparative solution been available for contributory negli-
gence in general.
69. In a strict liability case based on a defective product, courts have used "assump-
tion of risk" as a damage-reducing factor, defining it in such a way that it resembles contrib-
utory negligence. Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger, & Co., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983) (assump-
tion of risk defined as a voluntary and unreasonable encounter of a known risk).
70. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
71. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1090 (1972).
72. As Calabresi and Melamed explained in Property Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral:
When a loss is left where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God so
ordained it. Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement
to be free of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim's friends, if they are
stronger, from taking compensation from the injurer. The loss is shifted in other
[Vol. 51
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to some other party. The loss is shifted to a defendant on a variety
of theories: negligence, strict liability, or contract. Similarly, soci-
ety may decide that the plaintiff should properly bear the loss,
even when it would otherwise shift to the defendant, because of
the plaintiff's own negligence, a contractual agreement not to sue,
or some no-fault theory. Tort law has recognized both comparative
negligence 3 and contractual defenses,7 but to date it has had diffi-
culty recognizing a distinct "no-fault" theory. Assumption of risk
provides the missing element in this periodic table. It can be used
to analyze a plaintiff's conduct in exactly the same way that the
theory of abnormally dangerous activities is used to analyze a de-
fendant's conduct.
Two cases illustrate the application of strict liability theory to
abnormally dangerous activities by a defendant. In Spano v. Perini
Corp.,75 a garage owner sustained damages to his property caused
by the defendants' use of explosives in a nearby municipal-tunnel
project. The court held the defendants strictly liable for all dam-
ages caused by the blasting, although the decision to blast and the
manner of use were reasonable. The court recognized that explo-
sives were necessary to construct the tunnel and society benefitted
from the construction. However, the blasting still invaded the
plaintiff's entitlement to undisturbed possession and enjoyment of
his property. Although the defendant had been given the freedom
to blast, the question "was not whether it was lawful to engage in
blasting but who should bear the cost of any resulting damage. "76
After weighing the respective entitlements, the court held that the
defendants, and not the innocent plaintiff, should bear the cost of
accidental harm caused by blasting. 77 Similarly, toxic-waste dispo-
cases because the state has granted an entitlement to compensation and will inter-
vene to prevent the stronger injurer from rebuffing the victim's requests for
compensation.
Id. at 1091.
73. Buck v. State, 222 Mont. 423, 430-31, 723 P.2d 210, 215 (1986); Abernathy v. Eline
Field Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 208-09, 650 P.2d 772, 774 (1982).
74. E.g., Kuehner v. Green, 406 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 1983) (karate student's express
assumption of risk); O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 447-48 (Fla. 1982)
(plaintiff injured in amusement park horse stampede did not expressly assume the risk of
defendant's negligence); Van Tuyn v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 318, 321 (Fla. 1984)
(express assumption of risk of riding a mechanical bull).
75. 25 N.Y.2d 11, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
76. Id. at 17, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
77. Id. A similar approach was used in allocating liability when a car and its driver
were burned by the spillage of gasoline from a tanker truck. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash.
2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1973). The court held that the negligence of the defendant was irrel-
evant for two reasons: first, all proof had disappeared in the explosion and, second, the
defendant was strictly liable for any injuries caused by his transportation of gasoline. The
1990]
15
DeWolf and Hander: Assumption of Risk and Abnormally Dangerous Activities: A Proposal
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1990
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
sal frequently triggers the application of the abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine. For example, in Kenney v. Scientific, Inc.,78 resi-
dents in the vicinity of two landfills sued the state, municipality
and private operators for damages caused by the escape of toxic
wastes. The court held that the disposal of toxic wastes, past and
present, was an abnormally dangerous activity. Relying on the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, the court held that despite the social
benefit from disposing of the toxic wastes, "the unavoidable risk of
harm that is inherent in it requires that it be carried on at [de-
fendant's] peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person
who suffers harm as a result of it."'7 9 In addition, the court empha-
sized that "the creators of abnormally dangerous substances are far
better able than the victims to sustain the costs of the injuries." 0
As these two cases illustrate, defendants who engage in abnor-
mally dangerous activities are required to shoulder the cost of re-
sulting damages, even if they exercise reasonable care. As noted
earlier, Professors Calabresi and Hirschoff suggested that assump-
tion of risk should be viewed as a form of plaintiff's strict liabil-
ity;"1 although the decision to engage in a risky activity may have
been reasonable, society may justifiably expect the plaintiff to bear
the risk of loss, rather than forcing the defendant (even if negli-
gent) to do so. Perhaps the reason that this concept did not
achieve greater acceptance is that Calabresi and Hirschoff included
this suggestion as part of the Calabresian theory of the "cheapest
cost avoider," ' 2 in which fault and comparative negligence receive
secondary emphasis. Although Calabresi in a later article recog-
nized that the comparative negligence rule may provide superior
incentives for reducing accident costs, 83 he preferred avoiding the
court stressed that imposition of liability on the defendant was grounded not on the idea of
deterrence or punishment (the defendant may have acted non-negligently), but on a policy
judgment of which one of two innocent parties should bear the cost of loss. In reaching its
decision the court drew upon the criteria set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
Siegler, 81 Wash. 2d at 458, 502 P.2d at 1186-87 (citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)).
78. 204 N.J. Super. 228, 497 A.2d 1310 (1985).
79. Id. at 247, 497 A.2d at 1320 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 520 comment
h (1977)).
80. Id. at 248, 497 A.2d at 1321.
81. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11 at 1065.
82. Calabresi's theory of tort law as a search for the cheapest cost avoider is set forth
in G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970), and in Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and
Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975). For recent commentary on Calabresi's theory, see At-
tanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products
Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988); Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort
Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677 (1985).
83. Calabresi, supra note 82, at 663.
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determination of "fault" altogether. Instead, Calabresi would as-
sign liability to whichever party was in the best position to decide
correctly whether the accident should be avoided. 4
Perhaps because of Calabresi's doctrinal emphasis on the
search for the cheapest cost avoider, regardless of "fault," the the-
ory of assumption of risk as a form of plaintiff's strict liability did
not find its way into such reformulations of comparative fault as
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.85 The UCFA does, however,
treat the problem of what to do when a plaintiff's negligence con-
curs with a defendant's abnormally dangerous activity to produce
an injury. Unlike the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which does
not recognize contributory negligence as a defense to strict liabil-
ity,86 the UCFA proposes an inclusive definition of "fault," with an
assignment of shares of fault to any party whose actions create lia-
bility for an injury, regardless of whether liability is based on neg-
ligence or strict liability. Thus, if a gasoline tank truck spills gaso-
line and the plaintiff negligently drives into the spill, the tank
truck owner will be strictly liable for the injury but the plaintiff's
negligence would be a damage-reducing factor.8 7
Thus, if a plaintiff's decision to engage in an abnormally dan-
gerous activity like high school football is the mirror image of a
defendant's decision to engage in an abnormally dangerous activity
such as blasting, the mirror-image approach should be taken. For
example, take the Benitez case cited at the beginning of this arti-
cle: the student's decision to play high school football concurred
with the defendant's negligence to produce injury. Under the pro-
posed approach, the jury would then be asked to assign a percent-
age of fault to the defendant's negligence, and a percentage of fault
to the plaintiff's decision to engage in the abnormally dangerous
activity of playing football."
B. The Practical Arguments
In addition to the doctrinal symmetry that results from treat-
ing assumption of risk as a form of plaintiff's strict liability, impor-
84. Id. at 666. Under the Calabresian theory, not all accidents are worth avoiding. Just
as Learned Hand's calculus (supra note 31) requires safety measures only if they are
cheaper than the cost of an accident discounted by its probability, so Calabresi is interested
in locating the person best situated to decide whether additional safety measures are
worthwhile.
85. See infra text accompanying note 115.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1977).
87. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88. This, of course, is what the jury did in Benitez, but the New York Court of Ap-
peals rejected it by applying an all-or-nothing approach to assumption of risk.
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tant practical advantages suggest a percentage rather than an all-
or-nothing approach. As noted earlier, a major criticism of the con-
tributory negligence rule was that it forced juries to make an all-
or-nothing decision about where a loss should fall, even when both
plaintiff and defendant appeared to share responsibility. Those fa-
miliar with the actual administration of jury trials acknowledged
that juries frequently arrived at a compromise verdict despite legal
instructions to the contrary.8 9
A similar problem is likely to occur if juries are forced to
award all or nothing to a plaintiff who has assumed the risk of
injury but is also injured by defendant's negligence. The current
approach to assumption of risk in most jurisdictions creates two
Procrustean beds that do not accommodate cases like the high
school football player's injury. On the one hand, the court (or jury)
can (1) impose assumption of risk as an independent defense that
bars, rather than reduces, the plaintiff's recovery; or (2) abolish as-
sumption of risk as an independent defense (except for express as-
sumption of risk) and rely solely upon contributory negligence to
perform any damage-reducing function. Neither is satisfactory.
1. Retaining the Bar: Express and Implied Assumption of
Risk
Some courts have held that, because assumption of risk is not
a form of negligence, it is not affected by the adoption of compara-
tive negligence. In particular, many commentators and courts have
argued that express assumption of risk is a defense independent of
comparative fault.90 Unfortunately, confusion over terminology has
engendered uncertainty as to whether the emphasis is upon the
primary assumption of risk-in which the plaintiff has in effect
told the defendant not to make the activity safer-or upon the ex-
press (i.e., contractual) aspect of the relationship. Express assump-
tion of risk is theoretically based upon a contractual agreement
between the plaintiff and the defendant that relieves the defend-
ant of the duty to use reasonable care.91
89. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
863 (1975).
90. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 68, at 496; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 9.2,
at 152; Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County., 496 Pa. 590, 610, 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 (1981).
91. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 68, at 481. Such analysis must be carefully
distinguished from those cases in which the standard of ordinary care is modified because of
the plaintiff's preferences. If a plaintiff goes to a ski slope and wants a thrilling run, the
standard of reasonable care does not mean giving her a bunny slope; reasonable care permits
the defendant to give her a very dangerous vertical slope. See supra text accompanying
notes 27-30.
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This theory has limited utility in the case of the high school
football player. First, it is unlikely that the defendant can success-
fully argue that the plaintiff has in effect asked for the particular
danger of which he is now complaining, such as negligent coaching.
Unlike the unscreened baseball seat, the high school player would
not prefer a negligent coach to an adequately trained one. How-
ever, one might still argue that the high school player's express
agreement to forego a right to sue the school district would be a
complete defense.
Are such releases effective? The hornbook answer to this ques-
tion is: "There is in the ordinary case no public policy which pre-
vents the parties from contracting as they see fit, as to whether the
plaintiff will undertake the responsibility of looking out for him-
self." 2 Such agreements, however, are not binding "where one
party is at such obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the
effect of the contract is to put him at the mercy of the other's neg-
ligence." 3 How do these principles apply to the ordinary football
player? In Washington, two school districts required their student
athletes to sign a standardized form releasing the school district
from liability created by participation in school-sponsored extra-
curricular activities. Several students refused to sign and were pro-
hibited by their schools from participating in extracurricular activ-
ities. The Washington Supreme Court held that these releases were
unconscionable contracts of adhesion and, thus, invalid.94 If ex-
press agreements are found to be not unconscionable, they will in-
sulate the school district and its employees from liability regard-
less of their negligence. But if they are found unconscionable, and
no other provision is made for factoring in the plaintiff's decision
to engage in a risky activity, the plaintiff's share of responsibility
will be ignored.
92. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 13, § 68, at 482.
93. Id. See also Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986). The
appellant had accompanied her husband, an independent truck driver, on a business trip.
An accident occurred, rendering the appellant a paraplegic. Id. at 216, 721 P.2d at 344. The
Montana Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for defendant based on appellant's
having signed the following "Application to travel with my husband":
Furthermore, in the event of an accident or other manner wherein I may lose my
life, be injured, or in any way contribute to the injury or loss of life to another, I
hereby waive any rights whatsoever against Pre-Fab Transit Co. for what other-
wise might be its liability and agree that Pre-Fab Transit Co., its agents, employ-
ees and contractors are to be held harmless in all respects by virtue of my being a
passenger in said vehicle.
Id. at 216-17, 721 P.2d at 344. The court held that "an entity cannot contractually exculpate
itself from liability for willful or negligent violations of legal duties, whether they be noted
in statutes or case law." Id. at 221, 721 P.2d at 347.
94. Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist., 110 Wash. 2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988).
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Similar problems have occurred when courts have attempted
to apply the doctrine of implied assumption of risk. The analysis
of express assumption of risk should not be significantly different
from the analysis of implied assumption of risk, because both are
based upon the claim that the plaintiff has agreed to release the
defendant from the duty to use reasonable care.95 Courts have di-
vided on the issue of when an implied assumption of risk bars the
plaintiff's claim. For example, in Whipple v. Salvation Army,96 a
15-year-old boy was injured in a game of tackle football sponsored
by the defendant's youth program. The plaintiff alleged that his
injury was caused by the defendant's negligent training and super-
vision. The appellate court sustained the trial court's directed ver-
dict in the defendant's favor:
[A]s a matter of law . . . a 15-year-old boy, without evidence of
mental deficiency or untoward seclusion from life's experiences
common to boys of that age, sufficiently appreciates the dangers
inherent in the game of football so that he assumes the risk
thereof when he plays. In the present case, defendant created a
hazard, that of playing football, and plaintiff voluntarily exposed
himself to that hazard.9 7
On the other hand, consider Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver
County School District." The plaintiff suffered a detached retina
during a game of "jungle football." He sued, alleging that the
school district had failed to follow appropriate safety standards. In
response to the claim that assumption of risk should apply, the
court noted the different varieties of assumption of risk, and their
effect upon the issue of "voluntariness":
It is apparent that when the risk is defined more narrowly,...
the analysis of voluntariness changes .... Appellant was familiar
with varsity football and he voluntarily participated in it, but it
does not follow that he voluntarily participated in jungle football
if such participation was required to make the varsity team....
Another way to put this is that the voluntariness of appellant's
act must be proximately related to the danger (or the risk) which
caused the injury. Otherwise, the question of voluntariness, which
is said to be at "the basis" of assumption of risk, Restatement §
95. After all, the only difference between express and implied assumption of risk is
the degree of certainty one has about the nature of the bargain between the plaintiff and the
defendant. A signed agreement simply prevents controversy over whether an agreement was
in fact reached, and what its content was. The issue remains whether its enforcement is
consistent with public policy.
96. 261 Or. 453, 495 P.2d 739 (1972).
97. Id. at 462, 495 P.2d at 743.
98. 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981).
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496 E, comment a, would be avoided, for the only relevant volun-
tariness is voluntariness related to the risk.99
In such cases the court agonizes over whether the plaintiff's
encounter with the risk was truly voluntary.100 As the court noted
in Rutter, this analysis in turn depends on whether the risks are
defined broadly or narrowly. When the risk is defined broadly
("those who play football are likely to get hurt"), the average high
school player voluntarily assumes it. On the other hand, when the
risk is defined narrowly ("those who play football for a coach with
less than the recommended twelve hours of training in injury pre-
vention") then the average player will almost never be aware of the
risk and, thus, will not be said to have assumed it. As a conse-
quence, whether one focuses on express or implied assumption of
risk, courts are ill-equipped to ferret out whether the plaintiff's
purported waiver of any right to recover was truly voluntary. This
is not surprising, because such factual determinations are heavily
freighted with the larger policy question of whether it is more un-
fair to permit defendants to escape the consequences of their negli-
gence, or to let plaintiffs escape the consequences of their volun-
tary decision to encounter a danger.
Another blind alley is a false dichotomy between the "inher-
ent" risks of the activity and the risks imposed by the defendant's
99. Id. at 613, 437 A.2d at 1208.
100. In a recent article, Professor Simons states the problem in terms of whether the
plaintiff fully preferred the choice of participating in the activity (to not participating), or
whether in fact the plaintiff would have preferred some third alternative that the defendant
tortiously refused to offer the plaintiff. Simons, supra note 53, at 221. The difficulty with
this formulation is that it makes the plaintiff responsible for a risk only when the plaintiff
has been completely informed of all available choices and then has consciously selected the
injury-causing activity. In reality, almost all injuries are surrounded by varying degrees of
ignorance on the part of all participants. Neither the coach nor the player fully knows the
extent of their respective limitations in training, conditioning, equipment, or other similar
factors. If only a fully informed, fully preferred choice constitutes a defense, then it will
have almost no application. Professor Simons offers the illustration of a hang-glider pilot
who consciously decides not to fly surrounded by an iron cage, although the iron cage would
be safer. While the defendant would be exonerated from any liability in this scenario, it is
hardly any comfort to the manufacturer of hang-gliders, because no one would be likely to
make such an argument. However, the more realistic scenario is that the hang-glider frame
has an inadequate weld on one of the metal joints. The hang-glider collapses in mid-air and
the pilot is seriously injured. Because the plaintiff would have preferred a non-negligently
welded frame, assumption of risk would not apply under Professor Simons' model, unless
the defendant could show that the plaintiff knew all about the limitations of welded frames
and "fully preferred" that no further care be taken. That will rarely be true. Similarly, the
high school football player will never know all of the alternative ways that the game might
be played. Thus, assumption of risk would almost never apply. Yet it is precisely the case
that assumption of risk might plausibly be invoked.
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negligence."' For example, in Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland,
Inc.,102 both the jockey and racetrack owner were aware of the dan-
ger posed by an exposed metal bar anchoring the inside rail. The
jockey fell from his horse onto the bar and sued the race track
owner for his injuries. The court held that both the plaintiff and
the defendant were negligent and that the exposed metal bar was
not a danger inherent in horse racing.103 The court stated that if
the jockey had fallen from his horse to the ground, the claim might
have been barred based on an implied consent to normal risks in-
herent in the sport.
When a plaintiff is injured solely by a risk "inherent" in a par-
ticular activity, however, then the defendant has no need of the
assumption of risk defense, because the plaintiff will be unable to
show that the defendant's negligence caused the injury. But if the
plaintiff argues that the inherent risk was exacerbated by the de-
fendant's failure to use reasonable care (for example, to provide
proper instruction to the high school football player), then many
courts would find that the doctrine of assumption of risk is
unavailable.104
A similar analysis, with an opposite result, was used in Con-
radt v. Four Star Promotions, Inc."°5 Before entering a demolition
derby sponsored by the defendant racetrack, the plaintiff, an ex-
perienced driver, signed the defendant's standardized form releas-
ing the racetrack from liability for the obvious and inherent risks
of racing, including the defendant's negligence. Thereafter the de-
fendant reversed the direction of the race, and the plaintiff was
101. For example, the inherent risks involved in skiing (e.g., trees, steep, or icy slopes,
etc.) should be distinguished from the risks created by a defendant's negligent grooming of
the slopes. These are not, however, mutually exclusive sources of injury, as is sometimes
thought. Instead, negligence and inherent risk frequently combine to produce a single in-
jury, in which case it is improper to insist upon a decision of what "caused" the skier's fall,
just as it is improper to insist that the jury decide whether the defendant's speeding cab or
the plaintiff's illegal left turn "really caused" the collision. The correct solution in both
cases is to ask the jury to allocate the loss between the respective risks.
102. 105 N.M. 487, 734 P.2d 267 (1987).
103. Id. at 491, 734 P.2d at 271.
104. In fact, the treatment of inherent risk and the exacerbation of the risk should not
be treated as mutually exclusive causes. Consider the mirror image of the defendant's strict
liability: a truck full of gasoline has an inherent risk of fire that makes the operation of the
truck subject to strict liability as an abnormally dangerous activity; a negligent plaintiff,
however, may encounter that risk unnecessarily. Under comparative fault principles the two
causes of injury would be compared by the jury on a percentage basis. Similarly, instead of
forcing the trier of fact to decide whether a football player's injury occurred because of the
inherent risks of the sport or because the defendant negligently increased the risk of injury,
the court should permit a determination that both causes contributed to the accident, with
an assignment of responsibility accordingly.
105. 45 Wash. App. 847, 728 P.2d 617 (1986).
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subsequently injured. The plaintiff sued the racetrack alleging that
the negligent change in direction caused his injuries. The court
held that the plaintiff had expressly assumed the risks inherent in
demolition racing, and that the change in direction was within that
general category of risks. The court's decision may have been influ-
enced by the fact that the plaintiff signed a form expressly reliev-
ing the race track of its obligation to use reasonable care, but the
court relied upon a finding that the actions of the defendant were
within the inherent risks of the activity.
These cases illustrate the flexibility of the concept of volun-
tary assumption of risk, and the futility of searching for a
bright-and dispositive-line between the risks covered by the as-
sumption of risk defense and those which were negligently created
by the defendant. Regardless of whether one focuses on the plain-
tiff's voluntary decision to engage in the activity-risks and all-or
on whether the defendant's negligent conduct was known to the
plaintiff or not, courts cannot meaningfully distinguish between
those cases in which the plaintiff should recover all and those cases
in which she should recover nothing.
2. Abolishing Assumption of Risk: "Merging" It with Con-
tributory Negligence
Another approach to assumption of risk has been to "merge"
it with contributory negligence, which in effect abolishes it, at least
in its secondary sense.106 Even before the general adoption of com-
106. Many states have purported to abolish the assumption of risk defense, at least in
its secondary sense, by statute. See e.g., Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County, 496 Pa. 590,
613 n.5, 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 n.5 (list of twenty jurisdictions that have either "seriously
modified or abolished" the doctrine of assumption of risk).
Montana also abolished the doctrine of implied assumption of risk as an affirmative
defense in negligence actions in Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 211
650 P.2d 772, 775-76 (1982). A combination of assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence remains, however, a defense in strict liability actions. See Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d 17 (1983). In Zahrte, the Montana Supreme Court explained
two reasons for retaining the defense in strict liability actions:
First, the defense of assumption of risk in a strict liability action is different from
common law assumption of risk as applied to negligence actions. Secondly, we felt
that a defense should be retained for strict liability actions and that assumption of
risk may be the appropriate defense.
Id. at 93, 661 P.2d at 18. Of course, as noted previously, supra note 61 and accompanying
text, contributory negligence ought to be recognized as a defense even to strict liability ac-
tions. To invoke the defense of assumption of risk in a Montana products liability case, the
defendant must prove the plaintiff had "a subjective knowledge of the danger and then
voluntarily and unreasonably expose[d] himself to that danger." Zahrte, 203 Mont. at 93-94,
661 P.2d at 19. If so, the jury will reduce the recovery by a percentage share similar to the
comparison employed under the comparative negligence statute. Id. at 94, 661 P.2d at 18-19.
Accord Krueger v. General Motors Corp., - Mont. __, 783 P.2d 1340 (1989).
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parative fault, some commentators and courts argued for aban-
doning the term "assumption of risk" except to describe the situa-
tion in which a person expressly assumes a known risk.1"7 And
when the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the issue in Meis-
trich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,1°8 it held that the "second-
ary" sense of assumptionoof risk was synonymous with contribu-
tory negligence.'0 9 Thus, many courts and commentators seemed to
believe that assumption of risk could simply be relegated to the
same dustbin as last clear chance. However, such approaches sim-
ply shift the battleground to the dispute over what constitutes
"primary" assumption of risk. In the case of the school district and
the injured football player, it seems absurd to suggest that the
plaintiff would agree to relieve the defendant of the duty to use
reasonable care. In fact, as we have seen, many courts will prevent
enforcement of such agreements."' It may be that the defendant
met the standard of reasonable care, using the analysis applied
earlier to ski resorts and baseball stadiums. However, when the
jury is convinced that the defendant was negligent, a complete re-
lease of the defendant appears unjust.
Of course, it is possible to divide the damages on a percentage
basis if the plaintiff is found negligent. Some cases will certainly
permit such a result; for example, when a player is aware of a neg-
ligently created danger but proceeds to encounter it anyway. In
other cases, however, only a tortured application of the contribu-
tory negligence principle will achieve that result. Juries have found
that reasonable people do play football, hockey, and other danger-
107. H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 6.1, at 131 (2d ed. 1987) (citing 2 HARPER &
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, 1191 (1956)). More recently, in Abernathy v. Eline Oil Field
Servs., Inc., 200 Mont. 205, 650 P.2d 772 (1982), the father of the deceased plaintiff decided
to drive his son to school in a heavy snowstorm and became stuck in a snowdrift, perpendic-
ular to the traffic in the right lane. A 16,000 pound truck hit the car, killing the son. The
Montana Supreme Court ruled that jury instructions on assumption of risk were prohibited
in all negligence cases and only the issues of negligence and contributory negligence could be
considered. Id. at 211, 650 P.2d at 776. The court reasoned that assumption of risk and
contributory negligence instructions were contradictory because the former was governed by
a subjective standard and the latter by an objective one. Id. at 207-11, 650 P.2d at 774-76.
108. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
109. Many other commentators have called for the abolition of assumption of risk as
an independent doctrine. Paraphrasing an earlier commentator, Professor James suggested:
A plaintiff's reasonable assumption of risk would not bar him unless the risk
was one which defendant had a legal right to put up to plaintiff; and in such a
case defendant breached no relevant duty. A plaintiff's unreasonable assumption
of risk would constitute contributory negligence on his part; and this would be a
defense without the need to invoke any separate doctrine.
James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 185 (1968) (foot-
notes omitted, emphasis in original).
110. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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ous sports."' On the other hand, according to the abolitionist posi-
tion, the only other option for the court is to find that the defend-
ant owed no duty to the plaintiff.'1 2 As noted above, no bright line
separates injuries caused by negligence from injuries caused by the
inherent risks of the game. In fact, both frequently concur to cause
an injury. But without a comparative doctrine, in some cases the
player will be left with no recovery, despite the obvious negligence
of the defendant; in others the player will receive a 100% recovery,
despite his having consciously engaged in what he knew was a dan-
gerous sport. Neither option is satisfactory.
3. A Solution: The Percentage Approach
A few courts and commentators have suggested extending a
percentage approach to include reasonable assumption of risk. For
example, in Kirk v. Washington State University,"' a college
cheerleader was injured when she practiced a pyramid stunt on as-
troturf, rather than the softer indoor mats on which she was accus-
tomed to practicing. She sued the university for failing to provide
adequate coaching, and the university asserted assumption of risk
as a defense. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately approved
a jury instruction that allowed the jury to reduce the plaintiff's
damages to the extent she "'[v]oluntarily participat[ed] in an ac-
tivity which she knew to be dangerous.'
As obvious as this solution is, many commentators have ob-
jected to any reduction of the plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff
acted reasonably, that is, non-negligently. As noted, the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act included only unreasonable assumption of
risk in its definition of "fault," reasoning that reasonable assump-
tion of risk "is not fault and should not have the effect of barring
recovery." 1 5 This, of course, ignores the possibility of using rea-
sonable assumption of risk to reduce the recovery. After all, al-
though assumption of risk is not based on negligence, the same is
true of the UCFA's assignment of "fault" based on strict liabil-
111. See, e.g., Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 175, 191 Cal. Rptr.
578, 588 (1983).
112. Or the abolitionist might suggest that the standard of care be reduced in light of
the plaintiff's preferences, as discussed earlier in connection with the skiing cases. However,
when it is clear that the plaintiff would not have preferred the particular danger that the
defendant negligently created, it is difficult to see how the defendant's duty could either be
reduced or eliminated altogether.
113. 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987).
114. Id. at 452, 746 P.2d at 288.
115. UCFA, supra note 1, § 1, Commissioner's Comment.
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ity.116 Prosser and Keeton's discussion of assumption of risk con-
tains the same fallacy: reasonable assumption of risk should not
act as a bar to recovery. "Nor logically should it even factor in to
reduce the plaintiff's damages, since his conduct has by definition
been free from blame. 1 1
7
Other commentators, however, have been more flexible. Not-
ing the equally unacceptable alternatives of full recovery and no
recovery, one commentator has suggested that apportionment of
liability would be appropriate when reasonable assumption of risk
applies. "This approach is not precluded by practical constraints,
and would allow a jury to consider the particular equities in a
given case.... The law ought not seek out black or white solutions
when a compromise of gray comes closer to achieving fairness." ' 8
Some statutes have also attempted to find a middle position.
Arkansas' comparative-fault statute defines fault to include "any
act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach
of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sus-
tained by any party."1 9 Similarly, Professor Schwartz has sug-
gested that unless courts recognize reasonable implied assumption
of risk as a damage-reducing factor, the very purpose of the com-
parative system would be undermined: "The true meaning of com-
parative fault is comparative responsibility. When a plaintiff en-
gages in classic assumption of risk conduct, he is in part
responsible for his injury. '1 20
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED ASSUMPTION OF RISK- PRINCIPLE
If courts accept assumption of risk as a defense separate from
contributory negligence and treat it as an analogue to a defend-
ant's abnormally dangerous activity, how should they instruct ju-
116. Id. § l(b).
117. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 68, at 497-498. This language was quoted
with approval in Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 1988) (jockey
sued riding club for negligent operation of the racetrack; jury's finding of assumption of risk
reversed). Accord Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 174, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578,
587 (1983) ("If we assume a plaintiff has acted reasonably in regard to his own safety in
deciding to confront the risk, then his act of confronting the risk may not be considered as
'fault' justifying an apportionment of damages.").
118. Comment, Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Negligence System-Doctrinal,
Practical, and Policy Issues: Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc.; Blackburn v. Dorta,
39 OHIO ST. L.J. 364, 374-75 (1978).
119. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(c) (1987). However, as noted above, supra note 117,
in interpreting this statute, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the suggestion that
reasonable assumption of risk should serve as a damage-reducing factor, following the rea-
soning just criticized. Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 1988).
120. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 9.5, at 180 (emphasis in original).
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ries to recognize assumption of risk and apply it? If defendants
and plaintiffs are to be treated analogously, plaintiff's strict liabil-
ity, that is, assumption of risk, should only apply when the plain-
tiff has engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. Just as a de-
fendant is not held strictly liable simply because his activity poses
some danger to others, so a plaintiff should not be held to assume
a risk simply because her activity poses some danger to herself.
The doctrinal basis of strict liability for defendants' abnor-
mally dangerous activities remains unsettled. The Restatement of-
fers six "factors" to be considered-with no particular weight-
ing-in making the determination.121 In an influential article
Professor Fletcher suggested that courts have imposed strict liabil-
ity on defendants when their conduct posed an unexcused, "non-
reciprocal risk" to the plaintiff. Non-reciprocal risks "represent a
threat of harm in excess of the level of risk to which all members
of a community contribute in roughly equal shares." '122 A similar
analysis could be used in determining whether a plaintiff's conduct
qualifies as "assumption of risk." When a plaintiff engages in a
risky behavior common to many members of the community, the
defendant should have no expectation that a plaintiff will be made
responsible for her injuries. On the other hand, when a plaintiff
engages in unusually risky behavior that is common to only a few
members of her community, such as hang-gliding, she should ex-
pect to bear some of the risk of injury-even when someone else's
negligence also caused the injury.
In addition, in some cases a plaintiff's behavior, though not
especially risky, is risky enough to multiply the defendant's cost of
offering the activity. For example, many high schools are consider-
ing abolishing or reducing sports programs because of liability
risks. 2 ' In such cases a plaintiff's willingness to assume at least
part of the risk of injury-again, even when he is not at
fault-may make it possible for the defendant to provide the facili-
ties for the activity at a reasonable cost. A plaintiff's contractual
agreement to assume the inherent risks of an activity may estab-
121. The factors include: (1) the likelihood of injury; (2) the magnitude of harm; (3)
the extent to which reasonable care would suffice to prevent an injury; (4) whether the activ-
ity is a matter of common usage; (5) whether it is appropriate to the place where it is carried
on; and (6) its value to the community. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
122. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537, 547 (1972).
Fletcher attempts to justify the application of strict liability on the basis of "just deserts."
Calabresi and Hirschoff criticized Fletcher's approach for its failure to account for the way
in which notions of efficiency or distributive justice affect the determination of "just
deserts." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1078-80.
123. Gutis, Schools Watch Court on Liability Issue, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1989, at 3,
col. 4.
1990]
27
DeWolf and Hander: Assumption of Risk and Abnormally Dangerous Activities: A Proposal
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1990
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
lish an assumption of risk defense as a matter of law. Similarly,
some statutes require that the participant in a dangerous activity,
such as skiing, bear the responsibility for the inherent risks of in-
jury."' In such cases the jury would not need to determine
whether the activity was abnormally dangerous, but only what part
of the plaintiff's injury resulted from the defendant's negligence
and what part resulted from the inherent risks of the activity. As-
sumption of risk frequently arises in situations in which the plain-
tiff and the defendant have the opportunity to bargain beforehand
(hang-glider pilot and manufacturer, school district and football
player, Outward Bound instructor and camper, for example).
Therefore, an assumption of risk clause-used not as a bar, but as
a damage-limiting factor-should be judicially recognized.
The following is offered as a draft for the composition of a
suitable jury instruction:1 2 5
In this case the defendant contends that the plaintiff's injury
arose in whole or part from engaging in [skiing] [scuba diving]
[etc.] which defendant contends is an inherently dangerous
activity.
An inherently dangerous activity is one that
(1) is dangerous to an extent beyond that which the ordinary
person would expect to encounter in [his] [her] daily activities;
(2) was freely chosen by the plaintiff, knowing of its inherent
danger; and
(3) is one that may result in injury even when all reasonable
care has been exercised.
If you find that the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged
was inherently dangerous, you should assign the percentage of re-
sponsibility for the injury attributable to its inherently dangerous
character. If you do not find that the plaintiff's activity was in-
herently dangerous, you should not assign a percentage of respon-
sibility to the plaintiff's conduct unless you find that the plaintiff
was negligent, as will be covered elsewhere in these instructions.
Further refinement of this instruction would of course be pos-
sible, but it illustrates the ease with which the concept of abnor-
mally dangerous activities could be translated into a form that lay
juries could readily grasp and apply. Particularly in those cases
124. See supra note 30.
125. Another suggestion for application of the reduced duty principle can be found in
Dobson, Medical Malpractice in the Birthplace: Resolving the Physician-Patient Conflict
Through Informed Consent, Standard of Care, and Assumption of Risk, 65 NEB. L. REv.
655, 679 (1986) (obstetrical patients would have more options in controlling therapy if as-
sumption of risk doctrine were available to protect physicians by redefining his obligations
to the patient).
[Vol. 51
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss1/5
1990] ASSUMPTION OF RISK 189
where the status of the activity as abnormally dangerous has al-
ready been determined, juries should have no difficulty assigning
percentage shares, as they have done in cases previously cited in
this article.
VI. CONCLUSION
Assumption of risk ought to be an easy, rather than difficult,
branch of tort law. It corresponds closely to a defendant's abnor-
mally dangerous activity and ought to be given analogous treat-
ment. By allowing juries to assign proportionate shares of liability
based upon relative "fault"-as that term has been broadly de-
fined in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act-tort law can strike a
better balance between the expectations of defendants and
plaintiffs.
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